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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this dissertation is to examine U.S.-Iranian 
relations in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. It 
will probe whether Iran is a threat to the Persian Gulf 
security as claimed by the U.S. If so, does Iran need to be 
contained? If not, what other factors (such as America's 
desire for access and control of Middle Eastern oil) do 
determine U.S. policy vis-a-vis Iran? Since the end of the 
Iran-Iraq war and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini there has 
been a discernible change in Iran's foreign and regional 
policy and yet the U.S. continues to disregard these changes.
American hostility towards Iran has existed ever since 
the revolution which culminated in the fall in 197 9 of the 
Shah, a staunch U.S. ally, and the assumption of power by 
Ayatollah Khomeini who steered Iran away from the U.S. 
However, this has reached a new level under the Clinton 
administration. The U.S. perceives Iran as a "radical" regime 
working to undermine "moderate" regimes in the Gulf and thus 
U.S. interests in the area.
With the end of bipolarity there has been a corresponding 
increase in the directness and intensity of U.S. military 
involvement in the Gulf. The U.S. has now replaced its 
traditional Gulf policy of fostering a balance of power with a 
policy of dual containment. That is to say, U.S. Gulf policy 
has aimed to isolate Iran as well as Iraq in order to minimise 
the likelihood that either state will emerge as the hegemon of
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the Gulf. The policy is intended at preventing Iran from
benefiting from normal trade and political relations. Similar
to the policy of containing the former Soviet Union, America
intends to create pressure on Iran which will eventually lead
to the collapse of the current regime or weaken it to such an
extent that it will change its behaviour to one more amenable
to U.S. interests in the region. As Tarock explains:
The U.S. takes issue with Iran in five areas:(a) its 
alleged efforts to acquire nuclear and other weapons of 
mass destruction; (b) the threat that, once these 
offensive capabilities are acquired, could (in fact it is 
assumed will) be posed to its neighbours, ie the Persian 
Gulf states; (c) its alleged engagement in and sponsoring 
of international terrorism with a view to destabilising 
the Persian Gulf states friendly to the U.S.A.; (d) its
opposition to the peace agreement between the PLO and 
Israel; and (e) its alleged poor record on human rights.1
Western presence in the Middle East predates the
discovery of oil by at least a century. Located astride the
world's most lucrative trade routes it became a focus of great
powers for strategic reasons. The British and the French were
the traditional actors in the Middle East, their presence set
the framework for the discovery and exploitation of oil. Oil
is a strategic commodity; it is the fuel on which almost every
country's hopes for growth and economic prosperity rests. Oil
first found in Iran and then in increasing quantities
throughout the Middle East gradually assumed an overriding
importance not only to the countries of the region but also to
the industrialised nations of the West. The history of oil in
the Middle East consists largely of plunder by the Western oil
i Tarock,A."U.S.-Iran Relations:Heading For 
Confrontation?"Third World Quarterly,Vol.17,no.1,1996, 
p.150.
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companies and governments of this non-renewable natural 
resource and therefore of regular interference in the 
political, economic and military affairs of this region to 
secure their interests. While oil was found under Arab and 
Persian soils it was fully controlled by the West, the ill- 
fated nationalisation attempt of the Mossadegh government in 
Iran in 1951 proves the validity of this point. After the 
Second World War, especially in the wake of the 1956 Suez 
fiasco, the European powers were eclipsed by the superpowers. 
Oil, the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S., 
and the Middle East's strategic location, magnified the 
region's importance. The end of the Cold War left the U.S. 
dominant in the region, as the sole superpower able to shape 
the region to further its own goals.
As the final decade of the twentieth century opened, 
commentators popularised President Bush's reference in 
September 1990 to a "New World Order" as the successor to the 
Cold War. The revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe, together 
with the economic agony, political instability, military 
retrenchment and diplomatic disengagement and finally the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, destroyed the bipolar 
international system that had operated since the end of the 
Second World War. The world was left with one superpower, 
which had prevailed in the political, economic and military 
rivalry with the Soviet Union. However, the achievement of 
"security" through "victory" in the Cold War resulted neither 
in the revival of American isolationism nor in the dismantling 
of the formidable military apparatus that had been constructed
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to cope with a Soviet menace that had ceased to exist.2
On the contrary, the Bush administration that took office 
in 1989 proceeded with unexpected vigour to wield American 
diplomatic influence and military power against other 
perceived threats to world stability. A striking instance of 
this new determination on the part of the U.S. government to 
use its formidable power was President Bush's forceful 
response to the invasion and annexation by Iraq of the 
adjacent, oil-rich emirate of Kuwait in summer of 1990. The 
Bush administration promptly persuaded the United Nations 
Security Council to approve extensive economic sanctions 
against Iraq and later to authorise the use of military force 
to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait if they did not withdraw 
before January 15,1991. After securing the diplomatic backing 
of its former adversary in Moscow, the U.S. assembled a 
military force in Saudi Arabia consisting of NATO allies, 
together with those Arab states such as Egypt, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia, that feared the consequences of Iraq's hegemony in the 
region. After the expiration of the U.N. deadline for the 
evacuation of Kuwait, the U.S. led coalition launched a 
devastating air campaign against Iraqi military targets and 
then a ground offensive into Kuwait and Southern Iraq. The 
result was a swift military triumph that ejected Iraqi forces 
from Kuwait.3
Had Saddam been successful the economic status of Iraq
2 Ambrose,S.E ."Bush And The Gulf War" in Rise To
Globalism;American Foreign Policy Since 1938,Penguin 
Books,New York,1991,pp.381-397.
3 Ambrose,S.E .op■cit.,pp.381-397.
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would have been equal to that of Saudi Arabia which together 
with its population and military forces would have given Iraq 
strategic dominance in the region as well as posing a direct 
challenge to the West's, in particular U.S. control of the 
Gulf's oil. The U.S. could not allow this to stand, it was 
unwilling to see one person controlling all that oil. As 
President Bush declared in one of his speeches "our jobs, our 
way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly 
countries around the world would all suffer if the world's oil 
reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein."4 With the 
Iraqi threat diminished, there are many in the U.S. 
administration who point to Iran as the next big threat to 
Persian Gulf security.
The dissertation is therefore sensitive to the history of 
U.S.-Iranian relations. Thus chapter one will outline the 
history of U.S. involvement in the Middle East specifically in 
Iran. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
historical developments which have led to the situation in the 
1990s, so that the issues and problems in the ensuing chapters 
can be seen in their historical context.
For the last few decades the United States has been 
heavily dependent on imported oil, much of it from the Middle 
East. To be sure, it is not altogether clear, what the U.S. is 
doing in the Persian Gulf, or Why it is there in such force. 
However, it is clear that it has something to do with U.S. 
concern about oil supply. To the U.S. and her industrial
4 Goot,M.(ed.)Australia's Gulf War,Melbourne University 
Press,1992,p .37.
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allies, the threat to energy security now comes from regional 
powers, and the threat has more economic than military 
significance.
Chapter two will examine America's interests in the 
region, why it perceives Iran to be a threat to those 
interests and the steps it has taken in particular in the area 
of regional defence to deter that threat.
The foreign policy of any country may be understood and 
assessed in terms of its national objectives and capabilities. 
Therefore Chapter three attempts to explain the national 
objectives of Iran and the bases of Iran's foreign policy, 
both in its general context and in particular with respect to 
the United States. Iran is often portrayed as the main source 
of instability and the leading purchaser of weapons in the 
Persian Gulf. We are told Iran has tactically and deceptively 
"sugar-coated" its policy in the Persian Gulf by claiming to 
co-operate with other countries in the region. Chapter three 
goes some way into debunking such assessment by arguing that 
Iran's Gulf policy has recently become moderate and pragmatic 
in orientation; and that Iran is primarily interested in 
regional stability, co-operation with other Gulf countries, 
ani protection of its national interest.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is mainly concerned with issues of the 
present. However, very few contemporary issues can be 
understood without some knowledge of their historical 
background. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
historical developments which have led to the situation of the 
1990s, so that the issues and problems analysed in the ensuing 
chapters can be seen in their historical context. As well as 
providing a factual survey of events, this chapter will try to 
give a sense of the overall evolution of the bilateral 
relationship.
The long period of United States-Iranian relations can 
roughly be divided into three periods, the late 1930s-1953, 
1953-1979, and 1979 to the present. The relations of the first 
period were flimsy and sporadic, but the U.S. was increasing 
its presence and influence in the country. This period ended 
with the 1953 coup.
The relationship of the second period was characterised 
by America's deep Cold War involvement in the region. After 
the 1953 coup, Iran under the Shah became a client of the 
United States and joined the American Cold War alliance 
system. Iran came to associate itself under American 
leadership with Western security interests. Over a twenty-five 
year period, Iran's identification with American security 
interests was central in the foreign policy calculations of 
successive American administrations. Even in a period of
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reduced Cold War tension the U.S. still valued Iran primarily 
as a source of security in the Persian Gulf. However, the 1979 
Iranian revolution completely altered the relationship, 
transforming a dependable regional ally to a seemingly 
implacable foe.
AMERICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
America long stayed aloof from the European scramble for 
the Middle East; indeed the U.S. was the last of the world's 
powers to develop any interest in the region or formulate a 
policy towards it.1 U.S interests and activities in the Middle 
East prior to the Second World War were primarily private in 
nature, and the U.S. government made few decisions of 
consequence with regard to strategic or political developments 
in the region. American interests were limited to portions of 
the region rather than to its entirety. America's posture 
towards Iran was characterised by restricted contacts in the 
educational, charitable, and economic spheres and accompanied 
by a virtually total political indifference.
World War Two altered and enhanced U.S. interests in the 
region. Physical presence and strategic involvement in the 
area gave rise to concerns that ultimately led to the 
formation of a political and security policy for the area. Oil 
besame a military/political concern, thus making the strategic 
vaLue of the region more obvious. Soviet and Soviet-sponsored 
activity in the northern tier of the Middle East immediately 
afrer the Second World War contributed to U.S. concern and led
Rustow,D.A.Oil And Turmoil:America Faces OPEC And The 
Middle East,W.W.Norton & Company,New York,1982,p .61.
i
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to the formulation of policies designed to contain the Soviet 
threat. The Truman Doctrine, developed in response to the 
Soviet threat, became the first major political/strategic U.S. 
policy statement on the Middle East and presaged future 
policies.2
THE AZERBAIJAN CRISIS
In 1941, as Hitler's armies advanced into the Soviet 
Union, Russian and British military forces simultaneously 
entered Iran and promptly replaced the increasingly pro-German 
regime of Reza Shah with a more compliant government headed by 
his teenaged son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. According to the 
terms of the Anglo-Russian-Iranian treaty concluded on January 
29, 1942, Russian troops were stationed in northern Iran and
British in the south. Both foreign occupation forces, as well 
as the American contingent that later joined the British 
troops, were to be withdrawn within six months of the end of 
the war. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities, the 
Communist-controlled Tudeh party fomented a separatist revolt 
in the northwestern province of Azerbaijan bordering on the 
Soviet Union. The Russian occupation army prevented the 
Iranian government from suppressing the insurgency by denying
2 The Truman Doctrine was the pledge to employ economic 
resources of the United States to bolster friendly 
nations all along the periphery of the Soviet bloc that 
appeared susceptible to pressure from this powerful 
neighbour or to insurgency by domestic Communist 
movements connected by ideological affinity to the 
Soviet Union. The U.S. established a ring of 
alliances against the USSR with the intent of caging 
the Communist country and preventing it from spreading 
out. In the Middle East CENTO was established. It was 
to bridge the geographical gap between NATO in the West 
and SEATO in the East.
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its military forces access to the rebellious province. A 
provincial assembly dominated by the Tudeh was elected in 
Azerbaijan and promptly declared its autonomy, a move that was 
widely regarded by the West as the first step toward the 
absorption of the province by the Soviet Republic of 
Azerbaijan across the border. the Iranian Prime Minister 
received a set of demands from Moscow which included 
indefinite retention of Soviet troops in northern Iran, 
recognition of the autonomy of Azerbaijan, and the formation 
of a Russian-Iranian joint stock company to develop the 
petroleum resources of the northern provinces. Eventually 
after Western protests and support for Tehran the USSR 
withdrew its troops on the understanding that an oil company 
with fifty-one percent Soviet ownership would be instituted 
and Communists admitted to membership in the Iranian 
government.3
The Iranian Prime Minister Qavam Saltanah had agreed to 
grant the oil concessions pending Soviet troop withdrawal and 
approval of the elected Iranian Majlis. Once the troops were 
out of Iran, however, Qavam successfully reorganised the 
Cabinet with anti-Communist supporters. In December 1946 the 
Soviet-supported government in Azerbaijan was ousted and the 
Majlis rejected the oil concessions.4 As Milani points out,
3 Rubin,B.The Great Powers In The Middle East 1941-47, 
FrankCass,London,1980,pp.162-190.
Saikal,A.The Rise And Fall Of The Shah,Princeton 
University Press,Princeton,New Jersey,1980,pp.32-33.
4 Rubin,B.Paved With Good Intentions:The American 
Experience In Iran,Oxford University Press,New York, 
1980,pp.33-36.
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Even if premier Ahmad Qavam's legendry negotiation skills 
were instrumental in Stalin's decision to withdraw, the 
Shah and many Americans credited the United States for 
pressuring the Soviets to withdraw. Washington's and the 
Shah's almost identical readings of the 'evil intentions 
of Russian Communism' made them a natural ally. Moreover, 
the Shah saw in the United States a partner that could 
fortify his weak position.5
In February 1947, the Shah outlawed the Tudeh party after 
one of its members attempted to assassinate him. During the 
government crackdown the USSR openly supported the Tudeh Party
northern borders of Iran. Fearing an all-out Soviet invasion, 
the Shah appealed to the U.S. for support. Responding to these 
and other perceived threats of Soviet expansion in Greece and 
Turkey, on March 12, 1947 President Truman announced the 
Truman Doctrine, which proclaimed the U.S. policy to contain 
the spread of Communism.
The Soviet American rivalry, which had begun immediately 
after the end of Second World War, made it impossible for an 
area as strategically important as the Middle East to avoid 
being drawn into the Cold War.6 World War Two had altered and 
enhanced U.S. interest in the region. Physical presence and 
strategic involvement in the region gave rise to concerns that 
ultimately led to the formation of a political and security 
policy for the area. U.S. core interests in the Middle East 
were:1)preventing Soviet dominance and expansion of its power
5 Milani,M."U.S. Foreign Policy And The Islamic
Revolution",in Amirahmadi,H .Reconstruction And Regional 
Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf,Routledge,London, 1992 , 
p.239.
and Soviet made several raids across the
6 Mangold,P.Superpower Intervention In The Middle East 
Croom Helm,London,1978,p .10.
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and influence in the region; 2) assuring the flow of oil at 
reasonable prices, particularly to its allies;3)curbing Arab 
radicalism and in sustaining pro-Western regimes;4)ensuring 
the security and well being of Israel.7
The policy declaration was followed by the delivery of 
$10 million worth of surplus U.S. military equipment to Iran. 
As long as the Shah ruled, the provision of military equipment 
was the centrepiece of U.S. relations with Iran. This 
embryonic relationship grew stronger when Dr. Mohammad 
Mossadegh, was overthrown in a CIA/MI6 coup.8
MOSSADEGH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL CONTROL
In 1950 the Anglo-Iranian oil company had earned a profit 
approaching 200 million pounds from its oil enterprises in 
Iran; of this Iran had received only sixteen million pounds as 
royalties share of profits and taxes. The company's profit 
that year alone after deducting the share paid to Iran, 
amounted to more that the sum of 114 million pounds paid to 
Iran during the entire past half century.9 There was wide 
spread resentment among the Iranians and it was not just a 
matter of economics the people were sick of British meddling 
in their domestic affairs.
Mossadegh responded by proposing the nationalisation of 
the company's oil fields and refineries. The people were
7 Shlaim,A.War And Peace In the Middle East:A Critique Of 
American Policy.Vikinas.New York,1991,p .38.
8 Milani,M.op.cit..p.239.
9 Bill,J.A.The Eagle And The LiontThe Tragedy Of American-
Iranian Relations,Yale University Press,New Haven,1988, p . 63 .
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enthusicstic and there was widespread support. Consequently 
when h€ became Prime Minister in 1951 he acted on his 
proposal. The most important reason for oil nationalisation 
was pol.tical rather than economic. The primary means through 
which influence was exerted in Iran involved oil; so with 
nationalising the oil industry he aimed at freeing the country 
from great power control specifically the British. As Bill has 
written "throughout his political career Mossadegh had one 
preeminent political preoccupation a thorough opposition to 
foreign interference in Iran."10 This is why he believed that 
foreign concessionaires (i.e the British) had to be removed at 
all cosis and as Rubin says, "the American embassy in Tehran 
was reporting that Mossadegh had near total support from the 
Iranian people.1,11
"Tie British Labour government at the time, and its 
immedia:e Conservative successor in Oct 1951, were equally 
convinced that to give in to Mossadegh would mean not only the 
loss of British prestige, but also the crippling of BP and the 
British economy, since it would also threaten investments and 
other iiterests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in the 
face o: growing Arab nationalism.1,12 Because of Mossadegh's
actions the British were determined to get rid of him. They 
thus piepared the ground work for the destabilisation of his 
govermrent by imposing economic sanctions which served to 
undermiie confidence and precipitated an economic downturn.
10 Bill,J.A.op.cit.p.56.
11 Rubin, B . , op . cit. , p . 7 8 .
12 Saikal, A. , op.cit. ,p.4Q.
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Britain boycotted Iranian oil and the British fleet in the 
Persian Gulf made sure it was observed. It also reached a 
secret agreement with the oil companies not to export a single 
drop of Iranian oil. Mossadegh's nationalisation of oil 
threatened the interest of Western oil companies. The British 
managed to convince the U.S. that if he succeeded it could be 
a precedent for other oil producing countries in the Middle 
East, thus endangering U.S. interests in the region. That is 
as Bill suggests, "if Iran could nationalise the powerful 
British oil company in Iran, then why could not other oil 
producing countries do the same thing to American 
companies.1,13
To further strengthen its position the British government
chose to use the threat of Communism claiming that Mossadegh
had drawn too close to the Tudeh, Iran's Communist Party. Thus
they managed to convince the Americans that Mossadegh had to
go and that a reliable alternative would be the anti-Communist
but pro-Western monarchy.14
In a Washington meeting of the National Security 
Council ̂ Secretary of State predicted that Iran
would soon be taken over by the Communist that the world 
would not only be deprived of the enormous assets 
represented by Iranian oil production but that it would 
only be a matter of time before the other areas of the 
Middle East with some 60% of world's oil reserves would 
fall into Communist control.15
In wanting to prevent Soviet access to Middle Eastern oil 
the CIA masterminded a coup that restored the Shah to power.
13 Bill,J.A.op.cit. ,p.78.
14 Saikal,A. ,op.cit.p.44.
Yergin,D.,The Prize:the Epic Quest for Oil,Money and 
Power,Simon and Schuster,New York,1992,p.468.
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As the Iranian case clearly demonstrates U.S. interests in the 
region were global and regional. At the global level the U.S. 
was engaged in a worldwide struggle for power and influence 
with the former Soviet Union. At the regional level the U.S. 
policy was and continues to be a secure access to oil and 
sufficient production at reasonable prices. After his return 
the Shah set Iran on a consistently pro-Western course, which 
it maintained until 1979 when he fell from power.
PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION
In 1954 the oil dispute was settled. In exchange for the 
U.S. help in the overthrowing of the Mossadegh government and 
to ensure the delivery of American aid, the Shah compromised 
Iranian sovereignty and independence by returning the 
nationalised oil industry back to the foreigners. Thus the 
Western oil companies were effectively restored to their 
controlling place in Iran's oil industry. An international 
consortium to run Iran's oil industry was set up, fourty 
percent of which went to the U.S.. Iran was the only country 
in the region where it had previously been excluded. Also as a 
result of the Shah's dependence on the U.S. in the years that 
followed Iran's oil production was to be determined not by 
what was good for the country but as a result of Western 
demands for greater supply Shah obligingly provided. As Bill 
points out,"the intervention bought twenty-five more years for 
the Pahlavi dynasty and enabled the international oil industry 
to export at favourable terms 24 billion barrels of oil during
16
this tine."16
Fron 1953 onwards the Shah's regime required American 
diplomatic, economic and military support, not so much for 
protection against external aggressors as for its internal 
survival. U.S. support was the only prop that kept his regime 
from faLling apart. Since he had no solid domestic base of 
support he needed the backing of the U.S. to maintain the 
imposition of his rule.
Large scale U.S. assistance especially economic aid which 
had been refused to Mossadegh government suddenly became 
availab.e and on a much larger scale. President Eisenhower, 
who hac only a few months before refused a request for 
financial aid, now promptly decided to give $45 million 
emergency grant to the new government. U.S. bankrolled the 
Pahlavi government to the tune of $1 billion between 1953 and 
1960. Tiese transfers amounted to $576 million in economic aid 
and anoiher $45 0 million in military aid. 17
The United States and Iran proceeded to create a special 
relatioiship in the political and military sense. In fact, 
this relationship assumed the proportion of a close 
partnership, resulting in the establishment of a virtual 
alliancj. In 1955, Iran became a member of the Baghdad Pact, 
later rmamed CENTO, of which the U.S. though a non-signatory, 
was tht main sponsor and with which it closely cooperated 
through its participation in economic, military and
16 Bill, J . A. ,op.cit. ,p.93.
17 Bill,J.A.op.cit. ,p.H4.
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antisubversive committees.18 This relationship was further 
strengthened by the conclusion/ in March 1959, of the Iranian- 
American Bilateral Security Pact. According to Article 1 of 
the Pact,
In case of aggression against Iran, the Government of 
the United States of America, in accordance with the 
Constitution of the United States of America, will take 
such appropriate action, including the use of armed 
forces as may be mutually agreed upon and is envisaged 
in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability 
in the Middle East, in order to assist the government of 
Iran at its request.19
For the next two decades the Shah provided the West with a 
secure ally. Iran became the key guardian of Western interest 
in the Gulf.
THE NIXON DOCTRINE
In 19 6 8 when Britain decided to withdraw from the Gulf, 
the U.S. had tired of its peacekeeping burdens. Mired in 
Vietnam the U.S. judged that its regional allies should bear 
the burden of local defence, a policy articulated in the 1969 
Nixon Doctrine. Essentially, it was associated with Southeast 
Asia, but the principles behind it were also applied to the 
Gulf. The Doctrine implied that the United States was 
"shifting to an indirect projection of power through specified 
Third world allies." 20 This indirect projection of power 
would be in the form of weapons and economic assistance.
Iran's role in assuring the stability of the Persian Gulf 
was reflected in the 1972 decision by the U.S. to provide Iran
18 Bill.J.A.op.cit.,pp.116-117.
19 Bill,J.A.op.cit. ,p.119.
Rubin.B.op.cit.,p.128.20
18
with substantial amounts of military equipment, including some 
of the most advanced and sophisticated in the American 
inventory, as well as technicians and other advisers for the 
armed forces. The massive arms sale21 to Iran were justified 
on the grounds that on major international issues the policies 
of Iran and the U.S. were parallel.
From the American point of view, Iran's willingness to 
assume increased defence responsibilities in the Persian Gulf 
region appeared consonant with the general American objective 
of keeping that region in the state of "tranquillity and 
stability" . This was especially important in the era when 
conflicts between the two superpowers were often carried on by 
proxy. It was clearly in the interest of the U.S. to see Iran 
stronger, better equipped and organised to resist aggression, 
from whatever quarter it might come. Not only would Iran serve 
as a buffer against any Soviet aggression in the area, but the 
Shah was to regulate the Gulf, putting out any regional 
brushfires.
The relationship was based on some reciprocity. For 
example, in 1973 the Shah fulfilled the old nationalist dream 
and took full control of Iranian oil production. Later that 
year, when OPEC began forcing up the price of oil during the 
October war, Barry Rubin argues that the Nixon administration 
requested that the Shah hold down prices.22 Although in a
21 From 1969 to 1978 Iranian defence expenditure increased 
580 percent.Palmer,M.A.Guardians Of The Gulf:A History 
Of America's Expanding Role In The Persian Gulf,1883- 
1992,The Free Press,New York,1992,p .89.
22 Rubin,B.op.cit..p .13 9 .
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position to do so, he refused.
The American commitment to Iran was clearly immense 
during this period. The U.S. heavily armed this regional ally 
which, in turn, was to protect American interests in the 
region. The greatest irony of all was that the Guardian of the 
Gulf, both self-appointed and U.S. anointed proved unable to 
defend itself. Less than seven years after the British 
withdrawal in 1971 the Gulf was thrown into chaos with the 
Iranian revolution.
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
On the one hand, the U.S. had an apparently powerful and 
friendly ally; but on the other, the prevailing government of 
the day was corrupt, undemocratic and lacked nationalist 
legitimacy. Washington failed to understand that it played an 
integral part in the Shah's lack of legitimacy. The CIA's role 
in propping up the Shah in 1953, along with his continued ties 
to the U.S., led many in Iran to believe that U.S. continued 
to have direct influence in the Shah's government.
Shah lost legitimacy amongst other things by virtue of 
his collaboration with the U.S. government. As a result of the 
circumstances and method of his rise to power he was in a 
continuous struggle to prove his position of authority. He 
could not win support among the Iranian people as he was seen 
as owing his allegiance to a foreign power and not to the 
people of Iran. He was regarded as a traitor whose regime 
reflected American interests; his defence program, his 
economic and oil policy were all considered to be faithful 
execution of U.S. instructions. This lack of legitimacy among
20
his people about his kingship led to the uprising of 197 8
which led to his fall and flee in 1979. As Razi has written,
Shah fell because he became illegitimate in all 
different but overlapping major segments of legitimacy in 
Iran: nationalism, Islam and constitutionalism. He was 
never regarded as an autonomous and hence legitimate 
leader of Iranian people because of the manner in which 
he was established on his throne after having fled to 
Italy.23
The departure of the Shah from Iran and the November 1979
hostage taking were the fruits of decades of nearly continuous
clashes with European, and then U.S. intervention into Iranian
economic, social, political and cultural affairs. Iranian
aspirations for political and economic independence, and
commitment to political self-awakening, ran counter to the
U.S. policies of access to Iranian resources and containment
of any radical realignment of Iran's political system.
Consequently, decades of diplomatic relations came to an
abrupt end. The protracted hostage crisis that bedevilled the
last fourteen months of the Jimmy Carter administration
dramatically symbolised Iran's assertion of independence from
U.S. influence. Saddeq Qotbzadeh, one of Ayatollah Khomeini's
closest advisers is quoted as saying that:
one of Ayatollah Khomeini's objectives was to shake the 
United States to accept Iran's sovereignty and 
independence and to awaken Iranians to the USA's limited 
power.24
The revolution in Iran dealt a severe blow to U.S. policy 
and its position in the Persian Gulf. The Carter
23 Razi,G.H."Development Of Political Institutions In Iran 
And Scenarios For The Future"In Ahmad Jabbari and 
Robert Olson (eds.) Iran:Essays On A Revolution In The 
Making.Mazda Publishers,Kentucky,1981,p .64.
24 Milani.M.op.cit.,p.254.
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administration was slow to react to the abrupt transformation 
of Iran from one of the major pillars of U.S. policy in the 
region to an adversary. To a large extent, this was because 
the ultimate outcome of the revolution and its impact on U.S. 
policies and interest in the region were still unclear by the 
time taking of U.S. hostages overshadowed other aspects of the 
revolution. It was not until after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December 1979 that the Carter administration 
focused on the problem created by the loss of Iran.
The U.S. view of Iran and Saudi Arabia as the " twin 
pillars" providing stability for the Persian Gulf region 
proved illusory as the revolution in Iran changed the 
government from one friendly to the U.S. to one hostile to it. 
Iran's pro-U.S. government, which had provided a modicum of 
stability in the gulf, was replaced by a regime whose policy 
was interpreted as to promote instability and the overthrow of 
neighbouring regimes. The revolution, and the taking of U.S. 
hostages, dramatically altered U.S. policy.
At the same time U.S. policy was faced with another 
dilemma; the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 
december 1979. The Afghanistan invasion led to the Carter 
Doctrine.
Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any 
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf 
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interest of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, 
including military force.25
Declaring the gulf a region of vital significance and the U.S.
25 Palmer,M.A.op.cit. ,p. 106 .
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willingness to take military action, if necessary, to counter 
the Soviet Union, were important new dimensions on U.S. 
policy. Although the Carter Doctrine was applauded for 
recognising the potential threat of Soviet control of the 
West's oil supply in the Persian Gulf, critiques charged that 
it did not address threats to U.S. interest emanating from 
inside the Gulf and thus it could not guarantee access to the 
region's oil supplies. The outbreak of hostilities between 
Iran and Iraq less than a year after the enunciation of the 
doctrine appeared to bear out the charge.
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
The initial reaction of U.S. policy makers to the war 
between Iran and Iraq was that U.S. interests would not be 
served by a decisive victory by either side. The U.S. 
government believed that an Iraqi victory that brought down 
the Khomeini regime could well pave the way for Soviet 
penetration of Iran. At the same time, an Iranian victory 
would increase the "Islamic fundamentalist threat" to the 
other oil producing states in the Gulf. In either case, the 
victor might well become the preeminent power in the region, 
asserting its influence over the Gulf states. However at the 
same time Washington was particularly concerned that Iran 
might take action against the smaller Gulf principalities 
because of their support for Iraq.26
The Reagan administration sought to reassure U.S. friends
Hooshang,A .(ed.).The United States And The Middle East: 
A Search For New Perspectives,State University of New 
York Press,Albany,1993,pp.222-223.
26
23
in the region that the U.S. would stand by their side. Reagan 
agreed with his predecessor's assessment that the longer the 
war went on the greater the risk that either Iran or Iraq
would escalate the fighting and interfere with freedom of 
navigation in the Persian Gulf or act in other ways that would 
restrict oil exports. Consequently both belligerents were 
warned against interfering with the flow of oil.
After initial gains the Iraqi invasion ground to a halt, 
starting in April 1982, Iraqi forces suffered a series of
reversals and by mid June they were forced to retreat. The 
revival of the "Islamic threat" compelled the U.S. to adopt 
more assertive policies to contain its spread. The most 
significant action was the rapprochement with Iraq. The aim of 
this initiative, referred to as "tilting toward Iraq", was to 
pressure Iran to end the war by accepting a ceasefire. The 
U.S. was responding to what it perceived as the growing threat 
to regional stability from the "radical" Islamic regime in 
Tehran. The administration believed that U.S. interests would 
suffer a major setback if Iran defeated Iraq. It also believed
that an Iranian victory would produce an extremist Islamic
fundamentalist government in Baghdad that would become a 
threat to those Gulf states with ties to the United States.
In November 1984 formal relations between Baghdad and 
Washington were reestablished after a seventeen year break.27
The tilt toward Iraq was not supported by all members of 
the Reagan administration. Officials who believed containment
27 Hoogland,E."The United States And Iran,1981-1989",In 
Ehteshami,A.(ed.)Iran And The International Community, 
Routledge,London,1991,pp.35-39.
24
of the Soviet Union was a priority feared an obvious pro-Iraqi 
position could drive Iran into the Soviet camp. They were 
convinced that Tehran and Washington shared a common interest 
in keeping Moscow's influence in check; Baghdad in contrast, 
historically had assisted Soviet penetration of the region. 
Consequently, they obtained Presidential authority to
establish covert contacts with the Iranian government. During 
much of 1985 and 1986, the U.S. effectively pursued two 
simultaneous and contradictory policies in the Persian Gulf. 
Publicly it opposed the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, 
cultivated its new relationship with Iraq, and reassured its 
regional allies of its commitment to contain Islamic
revolution. Clandestinely, however, the U.S. negotiated with 
Iran for the release of U.S. citizens being held as hostages 
in Lebanon, and for the sales of U.S. made weapons. The 
unexpected revelation of these secret deals in November 1986 
deeply embarrassed the U.S.28
The revelations about covert arms sales to Tehran 
ultimately had the effect of ending the ambiguity in U.S. 
policy. Those who had advocated the containment of Iran were 
given an opportunity to formulate a more activist policy. One 
manifestation of this policy was the Reagan administration's 
decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers thereby entitling them to 
U.S. naval protection. This decision followed the May 1987 
attack, when an Iraqi warplane apparently in error, fired an
28 Hunter,S.T.Iran And The World Continuity In a 
Revolutionary Decade,Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington,1990,p .66.
Palmer,M.A.op.cit.,pp.112-127.
Hoogland,E.op.cit.,pp.39-42.
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Exocet missile at an American frigate resulting in the death
blamed for the Iraqi attack. The U.S. decided to significantly 
increase its presence in the Persian Gulf. To the Iranian 
leadership, U.S. military posturing meant that the U.S. was 
continuing its hostile counter-revolutionary policy and
apparently intended to use every means at its disposal to 
destroy Iran.29
The significant increase in military activity inevitably 
led to direct confrontation between Iran and U.S.,"culminating 
in a major naval battle in April 1988, when the U.S. Navy 
destroyed a substantial portion of the Iranian Navy, and the 
shooting down by the USS Vincenne of an Iranian civilian 
airline."30 As a result of pressures resulting from military 
intervention, and its activities in the U.N. the United States 
was able to achieve its objective when in July 1988 Tehran 
finally agreed to a ceasefire. Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini 
had accepted the peace proposal, which was considered to be a 
humiliation, the poison had been swallowed. From Washington's 
perspective, this situation, a stalemate was the most 
desirable outcome to the war. Neither country had achieved a 
victory or been defeated. However Iran remained more than ever 
suspicious of the United States.
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
During the latter part of 1989 and first half of 1990
23 Hunter, S.T.op.cit. , p . 68 .
Hoogland,E.op.cit.,pp.42-43.
30 Hooshanq, A.op.cit. ,p.23 0 .
of thirty-seven U.S. By a twist of logic Iran was
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Iran strove to normalise its relations with most of 
Washington's allies, including the Arab states of the Persian 
Gulf and the countries of Western Europe. Tehran had just 
restored formal diplomatic ties with Kuwait when it was 
invaded by Iraq. Iran denounced the Iraqi action but 
proclaimed its neutrality. The United States was concerned 
about the Iranian reaction to its military intervention in the 
Persian Gulf. This concern was heightened when Saddam Hussein 
suddenly decided to offer Iran peace on its terms. Tehran and 
Baghdad reestablished diplomatic relations and began the long- 
delayed exchange of prisoners of war. U.S. concerns that Iran 
would somehow try to sabotage the war effort against Iraq 
proved to be baseless. Although Tehran persistently condemned 
the U.S. military intervention, it just as persistently called 
for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. In addition, Iran continued 
to honour the UN-mandated economic boycott of Iraq. After 
Iraq's defeat, Iran opposed the continued U.S. military 
presence in the region. Iran's stated position has always been 
that outside powers should not intervene in the security 
affairs of the Persian Gulf but should accept the right of 
local states to manage their own defence.
CONCLUSION
The post-1979 problems between Iran and the United States 
were the direct consequence of U.S. intervention in Iran 
during the regime of the Shah. By 1953, there was widespread 
concern in Washington that Iran might become part of the 
Soviet bloc. When Iranian nationalist were trying to end the 
British government's control of Iran's oil industry and also
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were attempting to curtail the autocratic powers of the Shah, 
U.S. policy makers erroneously perceived Iran's internal 
political conflicts as instability provoked by Communist 
subversion. This perception led the U.S. to collaborate with 
Britain in carrying out the 1953 coup. The reinstallation in 
power of the pro-Western, anti-Soviet Shah proved to be a 
blessing for American interests. By 1970, Iran was perceived 
as a model of stability, and its ruler, as the U.S. policeman 
of the Persian Gulf.
The U.S. intervention in Iran after 1953 took the form of 
supporting the Shah, initially through economic and military 
assistance and then through massive transfers of sophisticated 
arms for which the Shah paid cash. As the U.S. progressively 
became identified with the unpopular political and military 
policies of the Shah, the Iranian perception of the U.S. as a 
country of positive, democratic values was seriously 
undermined. By the 1970s, the image of the U.S. among those 
Iranians disaffected with the royal dictatorship was that of a 
superpower exploiting Iran's resources and strategic position 
for its own benefit. The Shah's opponents accused him of being 
little more than a U.S. puppet, a leader serving the interests 
of U.S. economic and military interests to the detriment of 
Iran.
Inevitably , the Shah was toppled. Because he had been 
widely perceived as a puppet of the U.S., anti-American 
sentiment tended to be closely intertwined with the anti-Shah 
feeling. Officials in the U.S. administration, however, were 
no more ready after the revolution to acknowledge a legitimate
28
basis for this animosity, a crucial first step in reaching a 
diplomatic reconciliation than they had been to recognise it 
before the fall of the Shah. The long relations between Tehran 
and Washington had begun with the image of a "friendly" U.S., 
however, it ended with the image of a "satanic" power.31
Having outlined U.S.-Iranian relations, the focus of the 
following chapter will be U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, 
the new security arrangement it has installed to protect those 
interests and why it sees Iran as a threat to those interests.
31 The above conclusion is based on reading the following two books:
Rubin,B.Paved With Good Intentions:The American Experience And Iran.
Bill,J.A.The Eagle And The Lion;The Tragedy Of 
American-Iranian Relations.
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AMERICA AND THE PERSIAN GULF
INTRODUCTION
The focus of this chapter will be Washington's approach 
to Persian Gulf security. The region has been considered by 
successive American Presidents since World War Two as vital to 
U.S. strategic and economic interests. Both the location and 
the oil wealth of the area have played an important role in 
U.S. global strategy. Before the end of the Cold War the 
Carter Doctrine affirmed the United States' willingness to 
protect the Gulf oil supply at all costs, including possibly 
of going to war with the Soviets. In the post-Cold War period, 
the Gulf crisis prompted by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
brought into sharper focus the importance that America and her 
Western allies have attached to the question of oil security 
that the Gulf represents. The Persian Gulf security has become 
the top priority interest of the U.S.. With the Soviet demise, 
Washington is free from previous constraint about a direct 
military presence and the use of force.
The primary objective of American policy in the area has 
been the establishment of American dominance; Washington wants 
to control a politically volatile region which is of great 
strategic interest to it. As Saikal argues, The "unipolar 
security system" set in place by the former President George 
Bush is central to Bill Clinton's Middle East strategy. The 
system is not only intended to safeguard America's friends in 
the region but also to ensure the expansion of U.S. influence 
and power in the Middle East.
The four key, interrelated objectives of Clinton's
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strategy were outlined in a policy statement as (1) to 
protect U.S. allies and interests- most importantly "the 
free-flow of...oil at reasonable prices"from the 
region;(2)to enforce a "dual containment" of Iraq and 
Iran;(3) to promote an Arab-Israeli peace, on the basis o 
of a linkage between this and the second objective;and 
(4) to stem "the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
and promote a vision of a more democratic prosperous 
region for all the peoples of the Middle East. 1
Washington hopes to promote "peace" and "security" in the
region. However, rather than engaging in confidence-building
measures and use of arms controls it has embarked on a policy
of containment [a policy very similar to that used in the Cold
War to isolate the former Soviet Union]. It has taken steps in
improving its force projection capabilities, and expanded the
U.S. military presence in the region. Second, and equally
critical leg of U.S. strategic framework is based on American
efforts to elicit regional State cooperation, especially that
of Saudi Arabia.
U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
The principal U.S. interests in the Gulf has long been 
its oil resources. Two-thirds of the world's know reserves are 
in the Gulf area; four countries:Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and 
Kuwait share about fifty percent of all the oil reserves on 
the planet. While oil continues to be found elsewhere, the 
location of new fields increases faster in the Gulf region and 
the costs of bringing it on stream are very much lower.2
1 Saikal,A."The American Approach To The Security Of The 
Gulf",in Danspeckgruber,W.(ed.)The Iraqi Aggression 
Against Kuwait:Strategic Lessons And Implications For 
Europe,Westview Press,Boulder,1996,pp.179-180.
Baghat,G."The American Dilemma In The Gulf Region", 
Journal Of South Asian And Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol.XIX,no.1,Fall 1995,p.59
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Richard Nixon has been quoted as saying:
Now that its oil is the lifeblood of modern industry, 
the Persian Gulf region is the heart that pumps it, and 
the sea routes around the Gulf are the jugular through 
which that lifeblood passes.3
Given America's and the West's dependence on oil, and the 
sensitivity of their economies to changes in energy prices, 
Western governments do not want to see Gulf oil supplies 
monopolised by hostile powers or prices manipulated to their 
disadvantage. Equally Western governments led by Washington do 
not want the flow of oil from the Gulf impeded by violence or 
war.4
No less important than the natural resource requirements
in the Gulf are its financial resources. The countries of the
Gulf today provide vital support for the international
monetary system. Their capital investment in Europe and the
U.S. has been and remains an enormous contribution to the
dynamism of the Western economies. The role of the Gulf
States, particularly Saudi Arabia, in maintaining the value of
the dollar and the maximum degree of financial stability
cannot be overlooked. This is not an altruistic situation on
either part rather financial cooperation is vital to both the
West and the Gulf States. As Gause argues America enjoys
significant financial benefits from its close relationship
with the Arab monarchies of the Gulf:
At an April 1993 meeting in Washington on American- 
Gulf business links, sponsored by the U.S. Department of
3 Saveed,K.B.Western Dominance And Political Islam: 
Challenge And Response,State University Of New York 
Press,Albany,1995, p .21.
4 Baghat,G.op.cit., p.59.
32
Commerce, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the American- 
Gulf Chamber of Commerce, it was reported that direct 
Gulf investment in the United States totalled $407 
billion as of the beginning of 1992. It is unlikely that 
other types of regimes in these states would commit so 
much of their financial resources to the West in general 
and the United States in particular.5 *
The strategic significance of the region resulting from 
its geographic location has also generated U.S. interest. 
Located at the hub of Europe, Asia and Africa, the Middle East 
is a crossroad and a bridge. Unimpeded transit utilising the 
air and sea routes that cross the region and constitute 
significant global communication links is also an interest of 
the U.S.
THE NEW REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
The invasion of Kuwait had convinced Washington that 
prior arrangements for Gulf security were clearly inadequate. 
The lead in creating a new structure would have to be taken by 
local states, but protection of U.S. interests in the area 
dictated close U.S. involvement. Consequently in the immediate 
aftermath of the Gulf campaign, President George Bush outlined 
a new vision for peace and stability in the Middle East. In an 
address to a joint session of Congress, on 6 March 1991, he 
defined four challenges which he believed would have to be 
met. The first concerned Gulf security, he said, there would 
have to be a collective effort 1 to create shared security 
arrangements in the region". The primary responsibility for 
regional security would rest with the Middle Eastern states
5 Gause,F.G .Oil Monarchies:Domestic And Security
Challenges In The Arab Gulf States.Council On Foreign
Relations Press,New York,1994,pp.180-181.
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themselves, he said, but that U.S. was ready to help:
This does not mean stationing U.S. ground forces in the 
Arabian Peninsula, but it does mean American 
participation in joint exercises involving both air and 
ground forces. It means maintaining a capable U.S. naval 
presence in the region, just as we have for over 40 
years. Let it be clear: Our vital national interests 
depend on a stable and secure Gulf.6
Soon after the War ended, the Arab members of the 
multinational coalition produced a new plan for Gulf security, 
known as the Damascus declaration. In their declaration, the 
six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, 
kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman), 
together with Egypt and Syria, pledged to build on their 
wartime alliance to create a new framework for economic, 
political and military cooperation.7 As originally conceived, 
Egypt and Syria would provide military weight to the GCC, in 
return for economic aid from the oil-rich Gulf states. All 
would stand together in defence of the sovereign rights and 
territorial integrity of states in the region. In the weeks 
following the signing the declaration it became apparent that 
the GCC states were having second thoughts about long-term 
military arrangements with Egypt and Syria. The prospect of 
Egyptian and Syrian troops permanently based on their soil 
apparently made the Gulf states especially Saudi Arabia 
nervous. In addition Iran was quick to inform the GCC states
6 Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkin,The GCC States In An Unstable 
World:Foreign Policy Dilemmas Of Small States,Saqi 
Books,London,1994,p .141.
It must be noted that since this speech was made, there 
has been a change in U.S. policy, a limited number of 
American forces are presently stationed in Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia.
7 Gause,F.op.cit.,pp.129-130.
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that it would regard the establishment of an exclusive Arab 
security structure for the Gulf as implicitly hostile. Tehran 
was especially irritated by the idea of Egypt assuming a 
prominent role in the Gulf defence. In the end, the foreign 
ministers of the eight countries decided that the Damascus 
declaration would be implemented by each country according to 
its pursued policy. There would be no joint force, but each 
country could seek military help from its allies in time of 
crisis.8
This came as a disappointment for the U.S. and its 
Western partners. Consequently Washington pushed for a U.S. 
dominated system which has actually come into being. The new 
arrangement has two component: the presence, either in the
region or over the horizon of American military forces; and a 
substantial strengthening of the defence forces of the GCC 
member states."The system essentially rests on the notion of 
one major power taking responsibility for the security of a 
number of small and vulnerable allies within a vital but at 
the same time highly unpredictable region. In return, these 
allies are required to provide effective political, financial, 
and infrastructural support for the major power, so that it 
can act as the external guarantor of their security with the 
highest degree of impunity whenever threat arises. The system 
is structured into three interlocking levels: an alliance
between the regional constituents, bilateral security pacts 
between each regional member and the major power, and an 
overall regionally based command center and defence network
8 Hassan Hamdan Al-Alkin,op.cit.,pp.141-142.
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shared by the major power and the regional allies as a 
whole.1,9
Accordingly the U.S. has sought separate defence 
agreements with each of the conservative Arab Gulf states, and 
has actually concluded some like the one with Kuwait, which 
grants the U.S. the right to stockpile military equipment and 
ammunition in that country, to train its military forces, and 
to hold joint military exercises with those forces. The GCC 
states are expected to buy large amounts of American weaponry, 
in fact during the past five years large sales have been 
announced. American forces will have access to these weapons 
as well. As Baghat remarks, "in 1993, nearly 80 percent of 
American arms sales came from two major deals involving 
advanced weapons. Saudi Arabia bought 72 F-15 fighter jets
from the McDonnell Douglas Corporation for $9.5 billion. 
Kuwait bought 256 M1-A2 battle tanks from the General Dynamics 
Corporation for $2.2 billion."9 10
Saudi Arabia is expected to play a major role in 
strengthening the defence forces of the Gulf states. Saudi 
Arabia is seen as an essential security partner in U.S. 
efforts to create a new security system. While the Kingdom's 
military resources do not compare in size with those of Iran 
and Iraq and probably never will, they have steadily developed 
and today have a considerable defensive capability. Saudi 
Arabia remains the only one of the three major Gulf countries 
that is committed to "stability and security" in the Gulf and
9 Saikal,A.op.cit..p .181.
10 Baghat, G. op . cit. , p . 67 .
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its western orientation. While avoiding the signing of a 
comprehensive defence pact with the U.S., the two countries 
have settled on a fifteen year old military training agreement 
as the legal framework upon which to base their expanded 
strategic cooperation, defence procurement and training 
arrangement.11
The new security arrangements benefit the United States
in a number of significant ways:
It will give the United States legitimacy and the 
operational capacity to monitor, sanction, isolate, and 
finally punish those forces and movements within and on 
the peripheries of the region that adopt policy stands 
contrary to its own. It will enable the United States to 
act as over the horizon guarantor of regional security 
with little troop visibility on the ground. It will place 
it in full control of the weapons systems that it 
deploys. It will help Washington to deter its regional 
allies from requiring nuclear weapons and other arsenals 
of mass destruction. The system will require minimum 
financial contributions from the U.S. but maximum 
expenditures by the regional members to maintain the 
necessary infrastructural support for the alliance and 
U.S. operational readiness at the regional level. Last 
but not least it will help Washington to maintain, rather 
than diminish, its strategic alliance with Israel.12
CONTAINING IRAN
The United States views both Iraq and Iran as threats to 
Persian Gulf security, and Iranian-Iraqi rivalry as 
detrimental to regional stability as long as neither country 
is part of a U.S.-led alliance nor ready to participate in 
such an alliance on terms acceptable to the U.S. In this 
context, from Washington's perspective, the ascendancy of 
either power not only leads it to seek dominance over its main
11 Wilson,P.W.Saudi Arabia:The Coming Storm,M.E.Sharpe,New
York,1994,pp.92-95,123-125.
12 Saikal, A. op . cit. , pp. 182-84 .
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rival, but to extend its influence to the GCC as well.
In Washington there is fear that the Iranian government 
may be embarking on the same path followed by Saddam Hussein 
at the end of the 1980s- rearming, building a nuclear bomb and 
hoping to intimidate the GCC states into towing its line on 
oil policy.
The fear of Iran has existed ever since the revolution 
which culminated in the fall of the Shah and the assumption of 
power by Ayatollah Khomeini. Iran directly challenges the 
ongoing attempt by the U.S. to shape the world according to 
its own image and priorities. It has an ideological regime 
that continues to see Washington as the "Great Satan"; a 
population of 63 million; considerable oil and gas reserves; 
the Bushehr nuclear reactor deal with Russia; and growing 
military contacts with China. Washington rejects Iran's rights 
to self-determination and has tried to isolate it
diplomatically and strangle its economy.13
Back in 1996 the right-wing speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Newt Gringrich asked for a $A32 million covert 
action program to be launched against the Iranian regime, 
describing Iran as a "new evil empire" and calling for its 
overthrow.14 In May 1995 before the World Jewish Congress, 
President Clinton imposed a unilateral trade and investment 
embargo against Iran. The trade sanctions were followed in
13 Laipson,E. & Cottom,R."Symposium:U.S. Policy Toward
Iran:From Containment To Relentless Pursuit?",Middle
East Policy,Vol.4,nos 1&2,September 1995,pp6-7.
Saveed,K.B.op.cit.,p .22.
14 Bamdad Weekly,February 17,1996.(An Iranian newspaper
published in Sydney)
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July 1995 by the formation of the Fifth fleet to patrol the 
Persian Gulf and police Iran. The new fleet is the first to be 
created by the U.S. since the Second World War. As Tarock 
points out:
While Clinton's predecessors maintained some sort of 
dialogue with Iran, President Clinton appears to be 
interested only in containing and confronting Tehran. 
Iran's view of President Clinton's trade ban on Iran was 
expressed by the Speaker of the Majlis , Nateq Nouri, 
thus:"No government in the U.S. history has sided with 
Israel as much as the Clinton administration... for [at 
present] the supporters of Israel in Washington are very 
powerful.15
The fact that President Clinton chose to announce his 
trade embargo at a meeting of Jewish Congress in New York 
points to the fact that U.S. policy towards Iran is influenced 
by external powers. Israel has repeatedly expressed alarm at 
Iran's nuclear potential and drawn attention to continued 
Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, opposition to the 
peace process and assistance to the Palestinian Islamic 
Resistance Movement, Hamas. Some GCC states have also 
expressed their fear regarding the so-called Iranian ambitions 
to dominate the region and point to the incidents on Abu Musa 
and Tehran's acquisition of submarines from Russia.
Ironically, even tragically, the hardening U.S. policy 
toward Iran has coincided with the emergence of more moderate 
and pragmatic tendencies in Iran's foreign policy. Although 
U.S. academic experts on Iran have tried to draw attention to 
this development, it has largely been ignored by U.S. 
officials.
Washington, for political and ideological reasons, is
15 Tarock,A.op.cit.,p.150.
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highly exaggerating Iran's military and political power 
and hence its perceived threat to the Persian Gulf and 
the Middle East in general. The Clinton administration's 
assumptions about Iran are not based on the realities of 
Iran's foreign policy in the 1990s, but on the outdated 
assumptions that Washington had of Iran in the Khomeini 
era.16
This issue will be examined in detail in the proceeding 
chapter.
ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
The current definition of "security" by the United States 
in narrowly militaristic arrangements does not bode well for 
stability in the Persian Gulf region. A much broader 
definition of "security" encompassing economic, political and 
many other factors need to be seriously taken into
consideration.
The present American policy is to harness the region to 
its needs and wants, its " military protection" serves its 
desire to promote its own set of military corporate interests. 
In a region that is the most heavily armed in the world 
successive U.S. administrations have stated that they would 
like to see smaller arsenals on all sides. However, Washington 
has continued to rearm its friends heavily.
The broad rationale in the U.S. is that local friendly 
states must be equipped with the means to "protect" 
themselves, as far as possible with U.S. weaponry. However 
such actions by the U.S. under the banner of security will 
exacerbate the existing arms race in the region. The $3 00 
billion in sales of all types during the 1980s to the Persian
16 Tarock,A.op.cit., p.150.
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Gulf region which culminated in two devastating wars should 
underscore the bankruptcy of such a "security" policy. The 
military "tireat" to the Gulf states by Iraq and Iran has come 
into existence only as a result of virtually unrestrained 
massive arns and technology transfers by the industrialised 
nations. The current American insistence on a foreign military 
presence, combined with increased arms transfers to the Arab 
Gulf states and Israel, will only lead in turn to a greater 
determination by the two large Gulf nations to further 
militarise.
In post-war Europe France, Germany and other European 
powers came to the conclusion that military means were no 
answer to their respective countries' security concerns and 
thus moved to establish the European Community, integrating 
the countries of Europe, economically and politically. 
Similarly the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Middle 
East are nc less capable of implementing such arrangements. 
While the concept of a Persian Gulf Community might be some 
way off, confidence building measures can now be put forward 
which seek to overcome the economic, political and other 
problems tiat face the region. It is only through solving 
these issues that real peace, stability and genuine security 
will take root in the Persian Gulf region.
CONCLUSION
Folloving the Persian Gulf war, the United States has 
moved rapilly to assert its dominance in the region. Where 
vital interest are concerned, the U.S. has made clear that it 
will continue to practice coercive diplomacy tightly tied to
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the military in asserting deterrence, compellence and 
reassurance. Under the facade of making the Saudis the new 
guardians of the Gulf U.S. forces along with their Western 
allies are mounting a new colonial presence.
The current U.S. policy promotes competition not co­
operation. The record clearly indicates that past collective 
security arrangements in the Gulf failed largely because of 
their exclusionary features, to remedy such shortcomings, new 
approaches are required. Unfortunately this seems very 
unlikely in the near future. Avi Shlaim describes the current 
situation quite well:
President George Bush tired to present American hegemony 
as the foundation of collective security and the rule of 
law in international affairs. The Gulf war, he claimed, 
ushered in a New World Order. But Bush's claim exceeded 
the reality. The new order reflected the interests of the 
victors rather than any universal principles of justice 
or morality. Its hall-mark, like that of the old order, 
was defense of the status quo. America emerged as the 
principal guardian of the Gulf.17
In the following chapter I will examine the changes in Iran's
foreign policy following the the death
of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. I will also endeavour to
establish whether the charges put forward by Washington
against Iran are valid or not.
17 Shlaim,A.War And Peace In The Middle East:A Critique Of 
American Policy,Vikings,New York, 1994,pp.8-9.
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IRAN A THREAT?
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to show that Iran's Gulf 
policy has become more moderate and pragmatic in orientation 
and that exporting revolution is no longer Tehran's main goal. 
In fact Iran is primarily interested in regional co-operation 
and stability in order to concentrate on the reconstruction of 
the country's economy.
With a population of sixty^million and vast natural 
resources, Iran is as important in regional as well as world 
politics as it was during the Shah's reign. The difference is 
that whereas Iran was then viewed, by and large, as a 
stabilising force before the revolution, it is today regarded 
as meddlesome, ideological state bent on exporting its brand 
of revolutionary Islam worldwide. " The demonisation of Iran 
by successive U.S. administrations and the media has been so 
successful that any attempt at offering a more balanced view 
of Iran is almost certain to be construed as an apology for a 
"backlash", "rogue" and an "outlaw" state, words used by U.S. 
officials to describe Iran."1 Throughout the 1980s, the 
"radical" foreign policy of Iran was seen as the major threat 
to the interests of both Western governments and conservative 
Arab states in the Gulf area. However, in 1990, Saddam 
Hussein's attempted annexation of Kuwait shifted the focus of 
the threat from Tehran. Today, anxiety is again gathering over
1 Tarock,A."U.S.-Iran Relations:Heading For
Confrontation?",Third World Quarterly,Vol.17,no.1,
1996,p.149.
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Iranian behaviour and intentions.
The foreign policy of Iran is a very complex one, since 
Iran holds the distinction of being the only country where 
"revolutionary" Islam has thus far succeeded. "The tensions 
between revolutionary aspirations on the one hand, and the 
pragmatic requirements of conducting the affairs of the state 
and of dealing with the outside world on the other has deeply 
affected and coloured its international behaviour."2
Khomeini's reign during the 1980s was dominated by 
Islamic radicalism, revolution and war. Khomeini's world view 
was very important to the international relations of Iran. He 
saw the world as being divided into two different areas. The 
oppressor countries and the oppressed countries. He believed 
that the superpowers were the source of all the world's 
problems since both did things for no other reason than power. 
The Iranian leader wanted Iran to be independent from both the 
East and the West. Iran adopted an independent and non-aligned 
foreign policy and encouraged all oppressed muslim nations to 
throw off the chains of dependence and become free. Khomeini 
sought to exploit the superpower rivalry in the Persian Gulf 
and rebuffed Soviet and American overtures to his government. 
Given his desire to spread his brand of Islam through the 
Persian Gulf, he supported several attempts to destabilise the 
regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain in late 1979 and
2 Hunter,S.T.Iran And The World Continuity In A 
Revolutionary Decade.Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington,1990.
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early 1980.3
Following Khomeini's death Hashemi Rafsanjani took over 
the reigns of power and has worked to get Iran back on its 
feet after the devastating eight-year war with Iraq. He has 
promoted a more pragmatic agenda for both domestic and foreign 
policy issues. It is this agenda that will be examined in the 
remainder of this chapter.
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE GULF STATES
The relations between the Arab rulers and the Shah were 
never entirely devoid of rivalry and suspicion. Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, the two complementary pillars of the U.S. Gulf 
strategy, were themselves regional competitors. However, 
maintaining the status quo was the common broad aim within 
which the rivalries were contained.
With the Shah's departure from the scene, the situation 
changed drastically. Whereas the post-revolutionary Iran 
retained the element of dominance with even an enhanced 
menacing posture, the element of preserving the status quo was 
thrown overboard. The net result was an almost total 
strangement of Arab-Iranian relations.
The Iranian clergy had seen the energy of the revolution 
and intended to use it in Iran and abroad. The Shiite 
theocratic regime of Iran was the antithesis of the 
conservative, Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf region.
3 Gerd Nonnemann "The GCC And The Islamic Republic:Towards 
A Restoration Of The Pattern", In Ehteshami,A.(ed.)
Iran And The International Community,Routledge,London, 
1991,p.103.
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Along with the ascension of the Ayatollah Khomeini and
attempts to legitimise the regime came the calls for the
overthrow of the Gulf monarchies and the establishment of true 
Islamic states. It was accompanied by token financial and 
technical support for opposition movements on the Arabian 
Peninsula. In addition to the calls for the overthrow of Gulf 
monarchies, the Islamic republic attacked the legitimacy of 
the Saudi royal family's control over the holy places of 
Islam.4
The presence of sizeable Shiite populations in many of
these sheikhdoms, coupled with inflammatory rhetoric from
Iranian officials truly frightened the fragile and
conservative sheikhdoms of the region. Led by Saudi Arabia,
they took the position that the regime in Tehran had to be
contained. According to Saudi thinking, the best way they
could achieve this objective was to strengthen their military
forces and provide military assistance to the other Persian
Gulf monarchies which had very small populations and very weak
military forces. They looked to the U.S. to provide them with
the advanced weaponry, but before anything substantial came
from the U.S. the Iran-Iraq war had begun.5
The Khomeini revolution which was a blend of Iranian 
nationalism and Islamic puritanical internationalism, 
appeared poised to seek the establishment of an equally
4 Murden,S.Emergent Regional Powers And International 
Relations In The Gulf:1988-1991,Ithaca Press,London, 
pp.20-24.
Ahrari,M.E."Iran,GCC And The Security Dimensions In The 
Persian Gulf" In Amirahmadi,H . & Entessar,N. 
Reconstruction And Regional Diplomacy In The Persian 
Gulf,Routledge,London,1992,pp.194-195.
Murden,S.ibid.,pp.20-24.
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puritanical Islamic order in the Gulf region. The Shah 
had left a highly elaborate military infrastructure and 
armed forces that had decisive qualitative edge, both in 
terms of armament and military training over the armed 
forces in the Gulf countries. Khomeini's Iran made 
abundantly clear its ambitions to adopt measures that 
would alter the political order in the Gulf. Naturally, 
the peninsular sheikhdoms were not willing to take a 
passive view of the Khomeini revolution.6
Saudi Arabia and the conservative Gulf states formed the Gulf
Cooperation Council in 1981 to fend off the Iranian threat.
Iran was seen as the most threatening power in the region.
These states, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lubricated
the Iraqi war machine with their generous financial
contributions, estimated at over $35 billion. The eight year
of attrition cost billions in material damage and loss of over
half a million lives of Iran's youth, some two million injured
and impaired, and made millions more homeless.7
IRAN'S ECONOMY
The Iran that Khomeini left to his successors was far 
different from the one he had taken away from the Shah. Iran 
was a state which was internationally isolated and possessed 
of a tarnished image and a devastated economy. The most 
important issue in Iran is the economy. Economic stability 
will have to be achieved before Iran undertakes any major 
foreign policy initiatives. The economic concerns expressed 
during the Iranian revolution were not answered during the 
1980s. The economic problems have become a major concern for
6 Ahrari,M.E.op.cit.,p.194.
Gause,F.G .Oil Monarchies:Domestic And Security 
Challenges In The Arab Gulf States,Council On Foreign 
Relations Press,New York,1994.
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the regime.
The Iran-Iraq war hampered Khomeini's attempts at 
economic stability. The war severely drained the economy and 
led to shortages of basic consumption goods, increases in 
unemployment (around 17%) and inflation (5-10% per month). The 
entire population was mobilised for the war, moreover, 
government spending on the war effort was increased at the 
expense of many domestic programs. Khomeini's revolution 
failed to promoted economic growth in Iran. Instead, he 
prolonged the economic chaos. The per capita income of the 
population has declined by 50 percent, since the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic in 1979, while during the same period 
the population has grown by over twenty million.8 This has had 
a dramatic impact on the living standard and will continue for 
some time to come.
Khomeini left his successor the task of completing the 
Iranian revolution. Hashemi Rafsanjani was left with the 
challenge of rebuilding the economy and restoring some sense 
of stability to Iran. There are two issues which are prevalent 
in Rafsanjani's and his advisers' policy options. First, 
Rafsanjani has instituted the policy of producing five-year 
economic plans in Iran. Second, the Iranian economy will need 
foreign assistance in order to achieve growth. The first five- 
year development plan (1988-93) was based on attracting 
foreign capital, importing modern technologies, increasing oil 
revenues, and borrowing US$27 billion on the international
8 Amirahmadi,H."Iran's Development:Evaluation And 
Challenges",Third World Quarterly,Vol.17,no.1,1996, 
p.129.
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market.9 However without major changes in Iran's foreign 
policy, Rafsanjani's economic plan would have certainly 
failed. He therefore began pursuing a cautious rapprochement 
with the west and improved relations with all of Iran's 
neighbours.
IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY
The Iranian leadership's special attention to the
country's economic reconstruction and the forging of foreign
economic linkages has resulted in new emphasis on economic
diplomacy. In turn, the high priority attached to developing
foreign economic co-operation has necessitated the repair of
Iran's international image. As Hunter states,
They have slowly realised that they cannot operate 
outside the international system, no matter how corrupt 
and unjust that system may be. In effect, Iran has been 
going through the same process of adjustment to the 
international system that other revolutionary governments 
have experienced. This adjustment has not meant the 
abandonment of revolutionary goals; but it has often 
meant putting the requirements of national survival first 
and adapting revolutionary goals to them.10
The essence of the new policies has been the restoration of
stability to the Persian Gulf region, further and faster
reintegration into the world capitalist system and greater
participation in regional and global organisations such as the
United Nations. Collectively they aim to find a counterweight
to an unrivalled U.S. presence in the Middle East and West
9 Milani,M.M.The Making Of Iran's Islamic Revolution:From 
Monarchy To Islamic Republic,Westview Press,Boulder, 
1994,pp.231-233.
Hunter,S.T .Iran And The World Continuity In A 
Revolutionary Decade,Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington,1990,p .44.
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Asia, to improve Iran's economic position in international 
terms, and to accelerate the regional search for a viable 
"non-aligned" substitute for the underperforming Non-aligned 
Movement.11
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD IRAN
Despite the new trends in Iran's foreign policy the U.S. 
continues to point to Iran as a threat to regional security 
that needs to be contained. The U.S. claims that Iran poses a 
major and inescapable challenge, that the clerical regime 
seems to have broadened its policy of ideological expansionism 
to international adventurism. That Iran is committed to a 
confrontational policy as expressed in its relentless military 
buildup, including the development of nuclear weaponry, the 
increasing support for terrorism working toward 
destabilisation in the Middle East, a region vital to 
Washington's interests.
In attempting to neutralise, contain and, through 
selective pressure, 'eventually transform' Iran into 'a 
constructive member of the international community, the 
USA has adopted a two-edged strategy:(a) applying 
economic pressure and denying Iran access to modern 
technologies, thus keeping it underdeveloped; and (b) 
giving support to Iranian dissident groups based 
abroad.12
To neutralise Washington's containment policy, Rafsanjani has 
tried to reduce tension, avoid confrontation, and drive a 
wedge in the G-7 camp by strengthening lucrative commercial 
ties with as many of its members as possible, and particularly
11 Ehteshami,A.After Khomeini:The Iranian Second Republic,
Routledge,London,1994, p .146.
12 Tarcok,A.op.cit. ,p.159 .
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Japan and Germany. Both are dependent on Gulf oil, and they 
have chosen to pursue constructive engagement with Iran as a 
more effective way than containment to persuade Iran to modify 
its policies. Washington's view that Iran is a threat to 
Persian Gulf security is not obviously shared to the same 
extent by these allies.
On July 27,1993 the Assistant Secretary of State John 
Djerejian, in his address to the House of Foreign Affairs 
Committee, specified five charges against Iran:(1) disturbing 
acquisition of weapons by Iran;(2) Iran's sponsorship of 
international terrorism and assassination of its political 
foes; (3) a hostile attitude toward the Arab-Israeli peace 
process;(4) subversion directed against its neighbours;(5) 
violations of human rights.13 The question that needs to be 
answered is whether there is any substance to these charges.
IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF
With the defeat of Iraq in 1991, Iran has emerged as the 
major power in the region. According to the Clinton 
administration this is a great source of concern, since Iran 
is seeking to bring the area under its domination. However for 
Iran to bring the region under its domination it needs first 
of all to free the Persian Gulf from U.S. domination. This is 
almost an impossibility. Even if Iran were to be successful in 
this endeavour Iran would then need to become an economic and 
military power that it could coerce the Gulf sheikhdoms into 
submitting to its dictates. The eight years of war with Iraq,
13 Lenczowski,G."Iran:The Big Debate",Middle East Policy, 
Vol.3,no.2,1994,p.52.
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international isolation, and difficulties in purchasing 
sophisticated weaponry have reduced Iran's military, and 
economic strength dramatically. Iran no longer possesses the 
offensive capability that it enjoyed during the 1970s. Nor 
does it openly advocate the overthrow of GCC governments.14 
As Tarock argues,
an important point which is often missing in discussions 
about Iran's policy towards the Persian Gulf is that it 
is the largest and most populated country in the region, 
and because of its historical connection to the Persian 
Gulf, the Iranians feel entitled to play an active and 
effective role in the region. But wishing to play an 
active role proportionate to its size and historically 
important place in the region is far from wishing to 
dominate it. The Iranians are under no illusion that if 
the Shah, with full support of the West and $9.94 billion 
a year purchase of arms in the last years of his rule was 
unable to dominate the Persian Gulf, the ayatollahs, with 
only $1.2 billion purchase of arms in 1993-94 are in no 
position to do so either.15
In recent years Iran's regional policy has focused on 
three areas: firstly it has tried to shed its radical image 
that was characteristic of the Khomeini era. This is a 
difficult task because of the internal debate between 
moderates and radicals the internal power struggle has enable 
the radicals to influence Iran's foreign policy. The second 
factor in Iran's regional policy concerns its relations with 
the other Gulf states. Rafsanjani has tried to convince the 
states of the region that Iran no longer pursues policies that 
promote revolution in the Gulf. He has sought to reassure the
14 Tarock,A.op.cit. ,p .154 .
McCausland,J."The Gulf Conflict:A Military Analysis", 
Adelphi Paper 282,November 1993,pp.72-73.
Bill,J.A."The United States And Iran:Mutual 
Mythologies",Middle East Policy,Vol.2,no.3,1993,p.98.
15 Tarock,A.op.cit.,p.154.
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Gulf states that Iran is willing to coexist with their 
conservative regimes and to accept the territorial and 
political status quo. Consequently, the conservative gulf 
states feel considerably more secure than they did in the 
immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. Thirdly, a 
major premise of Iran's foreign policy in the Persian Gulf is 
that U.S. involvement in regional affairs exacerbates 
tensions, polarises interests, facilitates intervention and 
complicates settlements. The Iranian government has therefore 
sought to contribute to the creation of an environment 
conducive to the settlement of disputes by the indigenous 
states themselves- that is by regional security mechanisms.16
Iran's efforts to build closer links with the Arab states 
of the Gulf originate in its unsteady domestic political and 
economic conditions, and constitute the external elements of a 
policy devised to alleviate them. More specifically, they 
proceed from Iran's urgent need to pursue economic 
reconstruction; and signify an acknowledgment of the 
indivisibility of security and development. Iran's economic 
and political future is inescapably tied to access to the Gulf 
and by extension, to the Arab states which line its shores. 
The stabilisation of world oil prices so crucial to Iran's 
economic recovery necessitates co-operation, or at least the 
avoidance of confrontation with Saudi Arabia in the context of 
OPEC. Iran's conduct during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis and war 
earned political capital for Tehran; it set Iran and its
16 Bill,J.A.op.cit,p.102.
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smaller Gulf neighbours on a course to rapprochement.17 
As Tarock has written, while the security of the Gulf is of 
utmost importance to the U.S. it is of no less significance to 
Iran:
The security of the Gulf, and by extension the 
uninterrupted export of oil to the world market, is of 
no less vital importance to the economic life of Iran... 
Considering that 90% of the government foreign exchange 
revenue comes from the sale of oil, considering that 
Iran has to repay its foreign debt, which at present 
stands at $30 billion, and considering that it needs to 
finance the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1995- 
2000), estimate to cost $68 billion, from oil revenue, 
and finally, considering the trade agreements signed 
between Iran and Central Asian Republics for the 
transport of goods from the republics to Europe through 
the Gulf, the importance of a stable Persian Gulf to 
Iran can be better appreciate.18
IRAN'S MILITARY BUILDUP
The U.S. has accused the Iranian government of engaging 
in a massive military buildup and thus posing a threat to the 
Persian gulf security. The Iranian defence buildup is intended 
as an insurance policy, to deter all potential aggressors. It 
serves as an indication of Iran's resolve not to be 
intimidated, pressured or cajoled into docility. The defence 
buildup is intended as a deterrent against an aggressive 
regional state. In Washington eyes, Iran's behaviour is 
alarming. However from Tehran's perspective, the country does 
seem vulnerable. The rearmament program is deemed only prudent 
behaviour given the volatility of the region. Iran sees the 
American Gulf battle fleet, dominating local waters and air
17 Murden,S.op.cit. ,pp.7 8-91.
Afrasiabi,K .L.After Khomeini New Directions In Iran's 
Foreign Policy,Westview Press,Boulder,1994,pp.86-107.
18 Tarock,A.op.cit.,p.157.
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space. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Oman all
have bilateral agreements with the U.S.. Many also have
security arrangements with France and Great Britain. Of
further discomfort to Iran is the arms buildup of its
neighbours. These countries are strengthening their military
arsenals so the question arises why cannot Iran replace the
weapons it lost during the war with Iraq?
A statistical comparison between Iran's arms imports and 
that of its Arab neighbours would show that it is perhaps 
Iran vrtiich has reason to be apprehensive about the 
intentions of its Arab neighbours and not the other way 
around. For example, the Gulf states (excluding Iraq) 
have spent about $157 billion on their military forces 
from the years 1989 to 1992. In 1992 the CIA estimated 
that Iran was spending about $2 billion annually on arms 
imports.19
To the West of Iran lies Iraq which proved such a threat
in the 1980-88 war. There are also important security
considerations to the North of the country resulting from the
breakup of the former Soviet Union. Through Iranian eyes,
there are sound reasons for national security for expenditure
of resources on high-tech armament.
Iran's military in comparison with those of its
neighbours is much weaker than it has been for decades.
A brief comparison of regional air forces indicates, for 
example, that Iran trails its neighbours significantly. 
With 206 aircraft of which only 40 MIG 29s can be 
considered advanced, Iran must survive alongside the GCC 
countries with 624 aircraft that include such advanced 
planes as F-15s, Mirage 2000, and Strike and Interceptor 
Tornados. Saudi Arabia alone has on order or in operation 
over 150 F-15s. More alarming in Iran's view is the fact 
that even after Desert Storm Iraq still has 261 tactical 
aircraft.20
19 Tarock,A.op.cit,p. 155. 
Bill,J.A.op.cit.,p.103.20
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In a serious comparative study of the military balance in the 
region, Iran's military buildup is relatively modest in the 
context of the dramatic overall military buildup in the 
region.
With the fastest rate of population growth in the region, 
with relatively small oil revenues and with a devastated 
economy, it would be suicidal for Iran to make militarisation 
its top priority. Iran has legitimate defence needs. Therefore 
it is rebuilding and modernising its military, but with a very 
limited budget.
Iran's nuclear program is also a source of great 
controversy. While the idea of possessing the bomb must be 
tempting to the Iranian government, it is not clear that Iran 
actually has the manpower and the infrastructure to undertake 
a clandestine operation to build a bomb. What is clear is that 
the International Atomic Energy Agency has frequently visited 
all the suspected nuclear facilities and has concluded that 
all of them are for peaceful purposes only.21
Yet the United States chooses to ignore all these facts. 
This is because the "Iranian threat" is a good excuse to 
cement its hegemonic position in the region. The threat to the 
Gulf states does not come from accumulation of excessive 
military capability on Iran's part rather the immediate threat 
to these sheikhdoms lies in the danger of internal collapse. 
America's insistence that they spend vast sums of their 
resources on U.S. weaponry only exacerbates their domestic 
problems and may even accelerate their downfall.
21 Tarock,A .op.cit.,p .156.
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OTHER U .S . "CONCERNS"
Washington has expressed concern over the Iranian 
government's opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The 
Iranian opposition has less to do with its Islamic ideology 
and more with national security considerations. William Perry 
has been quoted as saying, to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that:
Iran poses a serious threat to Israel as well as to 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf states, and 
that only a combined force of Israel, the United States, 
and the Persian Gulf states can stand up to Iran's 
military power and deter its threat.22
Tarock, argues that In short, the Israel-PLO agreement has
created a de facto US-Israel-Arab alliance which, Iran fears,
has the potential of being turned into a vehicle for applying
political, military and economic pressure on it and thus
threatening its national security interests in the Persian
Gulf.23
The United States has also accused Iran of being a 
sponsor of terrorism. While Iran is by no means innocent of 
all terrorist activities, at the same time it is a serious 
distortion of the truth to blame Iran for many violent 
incidents that occur around the world especially in the Middle 
East. As Bill, has written, "there is a glaring lack of 
evidence to support the allegations that Iran is responsible 
for upheavals in places like Egypt, Sudan, Algeria and Bosnia" 
he goes on to say that many of the past accusations have been
22 Tarock, A.op.cit. ,p.153. 
Tarock,A.op .cit..p .153.23
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quietly proven false.24 One of the more recent allegations 
which was later proven to be groundless, was the bombing of a 
Jewish centre in Buenos Aires. Within hours of the bombing, 
Iran was accused of having masterminded the whole thing, but 
in the coming weeks Argentinian investigators failed to find 
any evidence implicating Iran and thus were forced to 
apologise.25
In addition Iran is condemned by the U.S. for human 
rights violations and political repression. This critical 
stance toward Iran is riddled with contradictions. Similar 
acts of repression, violence or human rights violations are 
routinely committed by secular or "friendly" regimes in the 
Persian Gulf yet usually they go unnoticed.
Similarly, during the Shah's reign his human rights 
record went unnoticed by America. As far as foreign policy 
matters are concerned, there has been a discernible tendency 
for human rights to be downgraded when in conflict with 
American self- interest. During the Cold War American policy 
makers sought to contain Soviet expansion and communist 
influence through economic and military aids. To achieve these 
goals, the Americans were willing to cooperate with any regime 
regardless of their human rights record, including that of the 
Shah's despite his dismal record on the matter.
This is not to condone any of the violations which are 
numerous that do take place in Iran, but the Iranian regime if
24 Bill,J.A.op.cit. ,p .101.
Laipson,E. & Cottam,R."Symposium:U.S. policy Toward 
Iran:From Containment To Relentless Pursuit?",Middle 
East Policy,Vol.4,nos 1&2,September 1995,p.7.
25
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not better is no worse than many of the regimes in the region 
whose records the Clinton administration choses to ignore.
U.S. OBJECTIVE IN "DEMONISING" IRAN
The Clinton administration and other U.S. policy makers 
have vested interest in demonising Iran, Islam and the 
governments and political movements which challenge the U.S. 
and pro-Western muslim regimes in its name. For nearly fifty 
years America was politically, economically, militarily and 
ideologically geared towards fighting a Cold War with the 
USSR. The United States seems to be attempting to fill the 
post-Cold war vacuum with another threat against which to test 
its bravado and power, and to provide a new justification for 
committing a large proportion of its budget to the defence 
sector - preserving jobs and serving vested interests 
associated with the military-industrial complex. The United 
States may be seeking a leading military role in world affairs 
to alleviate a feeling of insecurity associated with its 
gradual decline as a world power, severe internal socio­
economic problems, and the loss of economic ground to Europe 
and Japan. The U.S. is also anxious for a justification for 
foreign intervention to protect its interests in the Third 
World, especially the Persian Gulf oil. During the Cold War 
the policy of containment provided this. Now, in the post-Cold 
war era, the U.S. is in need of a new enemy in the region to 
continue its policy, an "Islamic fundamentalist" Iran is an 
ideal excuse.26
Jin,K.K.(ed.)Whose War?What Peace?Reflections On The 
Gulf Conflict,Aliran,1991,pp.116-119.
26
59
CONCLUSION
There was a drastic change in Tehran's Gulf policy 
following the 1979 revolution. The revolution was built around 
the concept of Iran as the centre of the world's Islamic 
movements and thus also the source of their momentum, this 
image generated an activist, confrontationist foreign policy. 
Relations between the Arab Gulf states and Iran which had 
never been entirely devoid of suspicions and rivalry 
plummeted. However, relations have improved since then. The 
Iranian government has been busy looking inward more than 
outward. The Iranian economy is in shambles.
Iran's size, its population, its industrial base, 
ownership of the world's second largest reserve of natural 
gas, and being one of the rich oil producing countries, all 
these combined obviously make for the potential of Iran as a 
future power. But the question of intention is important, and 
I think at this moment from all the evidence that is available 
that Iran although suspected of trying to dominate the region, 
even if that intention were true, does not have the capability 
for doing so.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was to determine to what extent, 
if at all, U.S. claims about Iran, regarding Tehran's attempt 
to "export revolution", and the so-called "threat" that it 
poses to Persian Gulf security, are real. It is apparent that 
perceptions of the "danger" posed by Iran are exaggerated. 
Apart from the fact that much of the criticism emanating from 
revolutionary Iran has been well-deserved, such as Western 
imperialism, Iran's influence has been overestimated. Despite 
provoking some violent outbreak in the region, Iran's export 
of revolution has generally been unsuccessful. The success of 
the Gulf states in suppressing or placating opposition in 
their societies has undermined Iran's influence considerably. 
Furthermore, being in need of better political and economic 
relations with other countries Iran has watered down its 
revolutionary position. It lacks the economic strength to have 
great influence, or to bring about Islamic revolution in the 
region. Iran is in the process of rebuilding, and has need of 
increased foreign currency earnings, inward investment and 
economic reform, if it is to stand any chance of recovering 
from the disruptions of revolution, war and population 
explosion.
The condition of the economy, including many of the 
measures taken to resuscitate it and Iran's foreign policy are 
inseparable. The resources which Iran can deploy in pursuit of 
its foreign policy aims depend to a large extent on the well­
being of the national economy. Conversely, the feedback from
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Iran's foreign policy can improve or worsen economic 
conditions in Iran. To a large extent, post-khomeini Iran's 
foreign policy has been devoted to securing co-operation to 
pursue economic reconstruction and development.
However, on the basis of history, geography and sovereign 
right, Tehran demands a leading voice in the affairs of the 
Gulf and hence in Gulf security. According to the Iranian 
leadership, the imposition of a security structure on the Gulf 
by foreign powers, especially the United States, is not only 
unwarranted interference, but also doomed to failure. They see 
the Arab alignment of the Damascus declaration and U.S. 
involvement in the defence of the Gulf states as directed 
against Iran. The Iranian government wants a security system 
which includes all regional countries. However, Iran's calls 
have so far gone unnoticed.
Instead, U.S. and Arab attention has focused more on 
Iranian rearmament, its potential to build a nuclear arsenal, 
its quarrel with the UAE over Abu Musa and the Tunbs, and its 
alignment with militant Islamic groups across the Middle East. 
Herein, the U.S. warns, lies the making of an Iranian plan to 
become a regional hegemon, and ambitions to fight a "holy war" 
with Israel. Iranian rhetoric feeds such fears, though the 
country's material capacity suggests many a limitation.
Iranian challenge lies in the alternative it offers for 
political, economic, social and spiritual direction, and the 
demands it voices for self-determination, freedom and justice. 
But is Iran a threat to international order as America claims? 
The term "international order" is very ambiguous- whose order?
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Many Iranians, and Muslims in general, would argue that the 
"order" that America is apparently seeking to maintain is a 
greater threat to them than they are to it. The ambiguity of 
the term makes it useful for Western policy-makers who want to 
present a hostile Islam to the public. For America a stable 
Middle East has more to do with the maintenance of the status 
quo, more specifically American hegemony and interests- than 
either peace, or justice.
In so far as Iran can find ways of reducing the impact of 
the Western dominated and U.S.-orchestrated "new world order" 
on its own socio-economic and politico-military system, it has 
been emphasising the importance of multilateral regional and 
international organisations and agencies in providing useful 
channels for the Third World to participate actively in the 
shaping of the post-Cold War international order. Iran itself 
has been busy raising the country's representation in such 
forums.1
In a speech to the 51st session of the United Nations
General Assembly, Dr. Ali Velayati the minister for foreign
affairs of the Islamic Republic expressed the following:
A pattern of behaviour that has been manifested in the 
past several years by the United States Government is the 
self-arrogation of the right to legislate for the 
international community by attempting to apply its 
domestic legislation beyond its borders. Recent 
unilateral sanctions enacted by the United States against 
trade partners of a number of countries not only 
constitute grave breach of various norms and principles 
of international law and many resolutions of this 
Assembly and other international fora as well as blatant 
interference in the internal and external affairs of 
other States, but indeed point to a very dangerous trend,
1 Ehteshami,A.After Khomeini:The Iranian Second Republic, 
Routledge,London,1994,p.164.
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which undermines the very foundations of contemporary 
inter-state relations... The Islamic Republic of Iran has 
referred these two pieces of legislation to the pertinent 
international tribunal. We strongly believe that unless 
this dangerous trend is arrested at its earlier stages of 
inception, it will have irreversible implications 
including undermining the credibility and reliability of 
international undertakings, if outlaws are left to 
trample upon the rule of law, peace and security through 
the globe will be in peril.2
Until the Iranian revolution, the American policy 
objectives in the Persian Gulf were to maintain its political, 
and economic relationships with the two most pro-Western 
countries in the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran played 
the key role for the security of the Gulf region compatible 
with the Nixon doctrine. The collapse of the Shah's regime in 
Iran and subsequent developments in domestic, regional and 
international policy behaviour of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
the hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war caused the 
relationships between U.S. and Iran to change drastically from 
cooperation to confrontation. Iran was perceived as a threat 
to the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms and American interests in the 
region.
Following the Persian Gulf war of 1991, U.S. policy 
towards the region has acquired a higher military profile and 
deeper political involvement. The U.S. involvement in Gulf 
security basically entails a commitment to supply, train and 
defend the GCC states; and a policy of containment towards 
Iran and Iraq.
2 Text Of The Statement By H.E, Dr. Ali Akbar Velavati, 
Minister For Foreign Affairs Of The Islamic Republic Of 
Iran Before The Fifty-First Session Of The United 
Nations General Assembly, New York,23 September,1996, 
pp.3 -4.
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The current emerging security system is insufficient to 
meet the potential long-term challenges to stability in the 
Persian Gulf. Instead an overarching structure in the region 
incorporating all the littoral states, and acknowledging the 
special interests of not only the U.S. and her industrialised 
partners but also of the regional countries is needed. The 
current American policy towards Iran will only lead to greater 
animosity between the two nations. The U.S. can only in 
conjunction with Iran achieve stability in the region. 
Unfortunately, it seems as if the relation between the two 
countries will remain extremely acrimonious for the 
foreseeable future.
If the Iranian "threat" is to a large extent 
"constructed" by U.S. foreign policy makers, as this thesis 
has demonstrated, then it is high time to deconstruct it, for 
the sake of peace in the Middle East.
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